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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates four questions. What are the logical presuppositions underly- 
ing classical probability that have a role to play in David Lewis's proof of triviality 
concerning probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities? To what extent 
and how are they avoided in fuzzy logics when we treat semantic evaluations as the 
analogues of probability distributions? The introduction into the classical setting of 
conditional events (or assertions)--as opposed to implications--as  class of objects 
whose probabilities are equated with conditional probabilities has been the object of 
much recent investigation. To what extent, if any, can fuzzy logics accommodate the 
analogues of conditional events? How is triviality avoided in conditional event alge- 
bras? 
KEYWORDS:  conditional probability , material implication, exportation, fuzzy 
implications, t-norms, residuated implications, conditional events, produc- 
tion rules, measure-free conditioning 
1. INTRODUCTION 
David Lewis's proof [1] that on pain of triviality conditional probabilities 
are not, at least in any straightforward way, the probabilities of condition- 
als can be presented as follows (cf. [5]). We begin with a language -~0 with 
classical connectives A, V, and -~ ; .~e 0 is then embedded in some larger 
classical anguage .~ that contains, for each pair of sentences a and c of 
-~0, a conditional proposition or implication a ~ c that counts as an atomic 
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proposition of the expanded language .~. To obtain the triviality result we 
adopt Adams's principle, the identification of conditional probabilities with 
the probabilities of conditionals: 
Every probability distribution p defined on .~ and belonging to 
some family closed under conditionalization on sentences of .~ 
satisfies the constraint that, for any pair of sentences a and e of So, 
if p(a) > 0 then p(a ~ c) = p(c/a). 
Hence, if p(a A e) > 0 and p(a A -1 e) > 0, then 
p(c /a )  =p(a  =~ c) =p( (a  ~ c) A (c v ~c) )  
=p( ( (a  =, c) A c) V ((a ~ c) A ~c) )  
=p( (a  ~ c) A c) + p( (a  =, e) A ~c)  
= p(a ~ c /c )p (c )  +p(a  ~ c /~c)p(~c)  
= p(c /a  A e)p(c) +p(c /a  A ~c)p(~c)  
= 1 .p(c)  + 0 .p ( -~c)  =p(e) .  
Thus a and c are probabilistically independent, if p(a A e) > 0 and p(a A 
c) > 0. From here one goes on as in [1] to show that p assumes at most 
four values on the sentences of _~0 .1 
It has been said, e.g., in [5] and [6], that Lewis's result depends on 
applying Adams's principle to iterated conditionals, conditionals with con- 
ditional consequents. This is contestable. The proof above hinges on taking 
Adams's principle to apply to conditional probabilities, i.e., in taking 
p(a ~ c /b )  to be p(a A c/b)/p(a/b), the latter being defined when 
p(a /x b )> 0 and identical to p (e /a  mb).  Iterated conditionals do not 
enter the picture. On the other hand, it is certainly the case that if we 
accept McGee's import-export principle [5]: 
p (a  =~ (b ~ c)) = p( (a  A b) ~ c), 
and we apply Adams's principle to the probabilities under p of iterated 
conditionals of the form a ~ (b =~ c), then the same identity results, this 
time without applying Adams's principle to the conditional distributions 
derived from p. 
I The name Adams's principle and the insistence that it apply only to simple conditionals, 
conditionals whose antecedent and consequent both belong to S¢ 0, comes from [5]. A 
consequence of p being four-valued on .Sa0 is that for any element a of -9:0 for which 
0 < p(a) < 1 the conditional probability distribution p('/a) is two-valued on the sentences 
of "~o" 
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The detailed proof above makes it evident that both properties of 
probability distributions and structural/logical features o f  the underlying 
domain are implicated in Lewis's proof of triviality: it appeals to logicoal- 
gebraic principles uch as the distributivity of A over V that may fail in 
nonclassical, nonboolean settings, and to probabilistic principles such as 
the additivity of probabilities over incompatible propositions and/or  dis- 
joint events. In taking a =* c to be a formula of the extended language Sp, 
we suppose that a =~ e can be composed with other formulas, including 
other =* -conditionals, and that the presence of such conditionals does not 
subvert classical ogical relations. That is, =* is used to form sentences 
that express propositions, just as the familiar connectives do, and the 
presence of ~ in subformulas does not affect the rules of inference 
obeyed by the other connectives. In the event, or set, idiom of mathemati- 
cal probability, a =~ e is some subset of the set of elementary events, just 
as a v c is (the latter being the union of a and c). Forging a connection 
between the linguistic and event idioms, we may take a proposition to be 
(represented by) the set of possible worlds in which it is true. Classically, 
every proposition divides the class of worlds in two. As a conditional, 
a ~ c is to be regarded in the same light, dividing possible worlds into two 
classes--those in which it is true and those in which it is false. For ease of 
future reference let me call an item a ~ c of this sort an implication (in 
analogy with "material implication" and the widely used "fuzzy implica- 
tion"). In due course this will be contrasted with the notion of a condi- 
tional event. 
A remarkable feature of Lewis's proof is that nothing need be assumed 
concerning the logical properties (e.g., the inferential relations) of the 
implications a =* c. All that matters is that the probabilistic identity 
p(a =, c) = p(c/a)  holds for all relevant probability distributions. While on 
the one hand nothing--other than that identification--is done to justify 
the name "conditional" (or "implication"), on the other this serves to 
illustrate the generality of Lewis's proof. 
The aim of this article is to get some sense of the extent to which 
Lewis's result depends on the underlying logical and algebraic features. 
I sketch some of the circumstances in which the introduction of a "condi- 
tional object"--either an implication or a conditional event--by a process 
sufficiently similar to the probabilistic one to merit the name conditioning 
leads to triviality analogous to the Lewis result, and also indicate how 
triviality is avoided in other circumstances. The topic is of interest, for the 
idea of equating conditional probabilities with the probabilities of implica- 
tions struck many as cogent prior to Lewis's result (see [1], [2], and [4]). 
Moreover, equating the semantic value of the implication a ~ c with the 
ratio of the values of the conjunction a A c and the antecedent a when 
measured on some suitable numerical scale--throughout I ake this to be 
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the interval [0, 1]--has been investigated in fuzzy logic and proves coher- 
ent in that setting. Taking v(a =~ c) to be v(a A c)/v(a) is one way of 
reading the evaluation clause for the implication introduced by Gaines in 
[7] (provided A is evaluated appropriately). Gaines's original formulation 
equates v(a =~ c) with min{1, v(c)/v(a)} and v(a A c) with min{v(a), v(c)}; 
the properties of the Gaines implication, as I shallcall it, are investigated 
and compared with those of other fuzzy logic implications in [8], [9], [10], 
and [11]. 
2. TRIVIALITY 
We need a general criterion of triviality. I suggest wo, one syntactic, the 
other semantic: 
• The syntactic riterion: that we consider the introduction of a condi- 
tional object by a procedure of conditionalizing to be reduced to 
triviality if the conditional turns out to be at least as weak as material 
implication, i.e., the conditional object a =, c is entailed by --1 a v e in 
some appropriate calculus. If, further, a A -7 c entails -1 (a =* c), the 
conditional will be exactly material implication (provided the relevant 
De Morgan law obtains). 
• The semantic riterion: that we consider the introduction of a condi- 
tional object by a procedure of conditionalizing to be reduced to 
triviality if the numerical semantic evaluation function assigning val- 
ues in the interval [0, 1] is two-valued. 
Notice that under these criteria this familiar triple of evaluation conditions 
yield a syntactically but not semantically trivial implication: v(~a)  = 1 - 
v(a); v(a V b) = min{1, v(a) + v(b)}; v(a =~ b) = min{1, 1 - v(a) + v(b)}. 
Our investigation begins with a variation on Lewis's result that proves 
more tractable for our purposes. I add to Lewis's assumptions and Adams's 
principle a further stipulation to take care of those cases in which the 
probability of the antecedent is zero. On the face of it the stipulation looks 
as though it would be simply an exercise in gap-plugging with few ramifi- 
cations. In fact, if plugged in the following way the consequences are 
remarkable. 
THE STIPULATION. For any pair of elements a and c of -~0, if p(a) = 0 
then p(a =* c) = 1. 
THEOREM 1 I f  the stipulation and Adams's principle are satisfied by a 
probability distribution p defined on a language .~ in which .200 is embed- 
ded and also satisfied by the conditional probability distributions derived 
from p, then p is two-valued on the smallest language containing -~o and 
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the implications formed from pairs of sentences of Sao, and closed under the 
usual formation rules for the connectives A, V, 9. 
Proof For any a and e in -~0, p ( (aAe)=c)=l ,  either by the 
stipulation or by Adams's principle, depending on whether p(a /x  e) = 0. 
Hence: 
• if p(c) > 0 and p(a /c )  > 0 then p(c) = p(c/x ((a/x c) =~ c)) = p((a 
A c) =, c/c)p(c)  = p(c)[p((a A c) A c/e)/p(a A c/c)] = p(c)[p(a A 
c/c)/p(a/c)] = p(a =~ c/c)p(c)  = p(c A (a ~ c)) < p(a =~ c); 
• if p(c) > 0 and p(a /c )  = 0 then p(c A ((a A c) ~ c)) =p( (a  A c) 
e/c)p(c)  = p(c) = p(a =~ c/c)p(c)  = p(c A (a =~ c)) < p(a ~ c); 
• if p(c) = 0 then p(c A ((a A c) =~ c)) = 0 <p(a  =~ c). 
Consequently, if p(a) > 0 and p(a A c) = 0, then p(c) = p(c A ((a A c) 
c ) )<p(a~c)=0.  But p (aA  ~a)=0;  hence, if p (a )>0,  then 
p(-~ a) = 0 and p(a) = 1. This establishes that p is two-valued on sen- 
tences of So; but that suffices for it being two-valued throughout he 
smallest language containing -~0 and the implications formed from pairs 
of sentences of S:  0 and closed under the usual formation rules for the 
connectives A, V, -7. • 
Given Adams's principle and the stipulation concerning implications 
whose antecedents receive zero probability under the distribution p, the 
distribution turns out to be, in effect, a classical two-valued semantic 
evaluation and the implication a ~ e is a material implication, i.e., seman- 
tically equivalent to -1 a v c. 
The key to the proof is the probabilistic fact that p(b/x ((a/x b) = e)) 
< p(a =~ e). The stipulation is required to show that this holds when 
p(b) > 0 but p(a A b) = 0. Why accept the stipulation? One fact about 
probability renders the stipulation extremely natural. If p (a )> 0 then 
p(a = e) = 1 iff p(a A e) = p(a); equivalently, if p(a) > 0 then p(a =~ e) 
= 1 iff p(-~a v e )= 1. The stipulation extends this fact to the case 
p(a) --- 0. McGee employs the stipulation in [5], although he does so on 
pragmatic not theoretical grounds. It is the probabilistic analogue of the 
gap-filling clause commonly added to or implied by characterizations of the 
Gaines implication (see [8-11]). 
Here's an analogue in terms of semantic evaluation of the probabilistic 
proof above: 
THEOREM 2 Suppose that (1) v(a ~ c) = v(a/x e)/v(a) when v(a) > 0, 
(2) v(a ~ c) = 1 when v(a) = 0, (3) v(a A b) = v(a) when v(b) = 1, and 
(4) v(b A ((a A b) ~ e)) < v(a ~ e). Then v(a) = 0 or v(b) = 0 when 
v(a A b) = 0. 
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Proof  Assume that v(a A b )= 0 and that v (a )> 0. Then, by (1), 
v(a ~ b) -- 0. By (2), v((a/x b) =* b)) = 1, so, by (3), v(b) = v(b A ((a A 
b) ~ b)). Hence, by (4), v(b) = 0. • 
Consequently, if v(a) = 1 when v(--1 a) = 0 and if v(a A --1 a) = 0, then 
v is two-valued. That v(a) = 1 when v(--1 a) = 0 is certainly the case if 
is evaluated as a strong negation [i.e., v (~a)= n(v(a)), where n is a 
strictly decreasing involution with n(1) = 0], for example, the most widely 
used evaluation clause for negations, namely v(-1 a) = 1 - v(a). 
Notice that in the proof  the first constraint is only used to establish that 
v(a ~ b) = 0 when v(a A b) = 0 and v(a) > 0. Hence, irrespective of how 
the implication is evaluated in other cases, provided this constraint is met 
and v(a A -1 a) = 0 for all a, (2)-(4) suffice to ensure that v is two-valued. 
Conditions (2), (3), and (4) are satisfied when A is evaluated by a 
continuous t-norm T and =* is evaluated by residuation on that t-norm, 
i.e., 
and 
v(a A b) = T (v (a ) ,v (b ) )  
v(a =~ c) = sup{x ~ [0, 1] : T (v (a ) ,  x) < v(c)}. 
However, a much more direct and more general proof  is possible in the 
case when /x is evaluated by a not necessarily continuous t-norm T, =, is 
evaluated by residuation on that t-norm, v(a ~ b) = 0 when v(a A b) = 0 
and v(a) > 0, v(a A --la) = 0 for all a, and v(a) = 1 iff v(--la) = 0. For 
then T(v(a),v(-~a)) = 0 < v(b) and so v (~a)  < v(a =, b) for any a, b. 
Now, let v(a) > 0, and choose b so that v(a A b) = 0 [e.g., b = -7 (c ~ c)]. 
Then v(-1 a) = 0 and v(a) = 1. 
I end this section by noting that (2) and (3) are immediate from the 
properties of  t-norms and by showing how (4) is obtained for continuous 
t-norms. Condit ion (4) follows from these two facts which will be useful to 
us below: 
(a) This variant of  modus ponens holds for the implication evaluated by 
residuation on the continuous t-norm T: T(v(a), v(a =~ c)) < v(c). 2 
2As is well known, without continuity it may not be the case that modus ponens is valid, i.e., 
that T(v(a), v(a ~ b)) < v(h). Let Tw(x, y) be the minimal t-norm defined by Tw(x, 1) = 
T~(1, x) = x; Tw(x, y) = 0 if xy = 0 or xy < min{x, y). Residuation on T W gives rise to these 
evaluation clauses for the conditional: 
if v(a) < 1 then v (a~h)  = 1; 
if v(a) = 1 then v (a~h)  =v(h). 
But now, T,~(v(a), o(a ~ b)) = v(a) ~ v(h) when v(h) < v(a) < 1. 
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(b) When A is evaluated by the continuous t-norm T and ~ is 
evaluated by residuation on that t-norm, then the semantic equiva- 
lent of McGee's import-export principle obtains (see [13]): 
v(b ~ (a ~ c)) = v((a A b) ~ c). 
(a): If x < v(a ~ c) then T(v(a), x) < v(c), so, by continuity, T(v(a), 
v(a =, c)) < v(c). 
(b): If x < v(b ~ (a ~ c)) then T(v(b), x) < v(a ~ c), so, by continuity, 
T(v(a), T(v(b), x)) < v(c); hence T(v(a A b), x) _< v(c) and x < v((a A b) 
c). 3 If T(v(a A b),x) < v(c) then T(v(a),T(v(b), x)) _< v(c), so 
T(v(b), x) < v(a ~ c) and x < v(b =~ (a =, c)). 
Therefore v((a A b) ~ c) = v(b =~ (a ~ c)). 
(a) and (b) thus give us the validity of this inference: 
bA ((a Ab)  ~c)  ~-a ~c ,  
whose significance is discussed in the next section. 4 
Theorem 2 shows that constraint (1), or its weakening to the require- 
ment that v (a=~b)=0 when v (a /xb)=0 and v (a )>0,  forces any 
continuous t-norm to be positive on the values v takes, i.e., if v(a). v(b) > 0 
then T(v(a), v(b)) > 0. But then we cannot have v(a A -~a) = 0 generally 
unless either v is two-valued or ~ is not a strong negation. 
Why the concern for implications defined by residuation on continuous 
t-norms? Because relative to the conjunction operation evaluated by the 
t-norm, the implication evaluated by residuation satisfies the semantic 
analogue of the familiar algebraic, lattice-theoretic, proof-theoretic char- 
acterization of an implication, viz., the weakest proposition, modulo logical 
equivalence, that conjoined with its antecedent entails its consequent. 
When this condition obtains, we have grounds for thinking the term 
"implication" more than an arbitrary label. 
From here on we shall take -7 to be evaluated by the standard negation 
clause: v(-~ a) = 1 - v(a). 
3Continuity is needed here. Consider the discontinuous t-norm defined as follows: T(x,  y) = xy 
if min{x, y} < 3; otherwise T(x,  y) = min{x, y}. This yields the following conditional by 
residuation: v(a ~ c) = 1 if v(a) < v(c); v(a ~ c) = v(c)/v(a) if v(c) < v(a) < ½ or v(a) _> ½ 
1 1 v(a)/2 _< v(c) < 3; v(a =, c) = v(c) if ~_< v(c) < and v(e) < v(a)/2; v(a ~ c) = ½ if z < 
v(a). When v(a)=0.7,  v(b)=0.5,  and v(c)=0.4,  we have that v (h~(a~c) )= 1 but 
v((a A b) ~ e) = 0.5. 
4Here and throughout I read "a ~- b" ambiguously either as an assertion of validity or as a 
sequent whose validity is in question. Context makes clear which reading is intended. Except 
where we are concerned with designated-value s mantics, "a F- b" is equivalent to "v(a) < 
v(b) for all semantic valuations v." 
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3. FACTUALITY AND MODUS PONENS 
I call this schema the factuality principle: 
b, ( (aAb)  ~c)  l -a=c ,  
and I call a conditional for which it is valid factual. The motivation for 
the name is that the inference schema permits the dropping of factual 
in format ion- -what  one assumes to be the case in the context of the 
in ference- - f rom the antecedents of  conditionals. A conditional can be 
responsive to factual information in another way- -permit t ing introduction 
of factual information in the consequent: 
b,a~c l - - -a~ (bAc).  
This inference schema is also probabilistically valid in that p(b A (a =, c)) 
_< p(a ~ (b A c)), but it will not figure in what is to follow. 5 The two 
schemata together permit the transfer of  factual information from an- 
tecedent to consequent of  a conditional. Both hold good of material 
implication but fail for strong implications and counterfactuals. 
At least some of the indicative conditionals we use in everyday discourse 
are factual. Whether  all are factual is an empirical matter that need not 
detain us here. The important logical fact about factual conditionals is 
this: given enough classical logic in the background, factual conditionals 
are no stronger than material implications. 
THEOREM 3 In any logic containing the following five rules factual 
conditionals are syntactically trivial: (1) the weak rule of conditional proof 
according to which if a F- b then ~- a ~ b; (2) A-introduction; (3) 
A-elimination; (4) ex contradictione quodlibet, i.e. a A -7 a t- b; (5) the 
weak v-elimination (proof by cases) of quantum logic in which only the 
components of the eliminated isjunction may occur as undischarged as- 
sumptions in the subproofs. 
SThis notion of probabilistic validity is equivalent to the one presented by Edgington (and due 
to Adams) in [14]: where the uncertainty of a proposition is 1 minus its probability, an 
argument is probabilisticaily valid iff under no assignment ofprobabilities i the uncertainty 
of the conclusion greater than the sum of the uncertainties ofthe premises. Incidentally, this 
criterion shows that Wilson [13] is mistaken in saying that "logical rules not allowing 
eontraposition have a rather odd property: If 'if a then b' is such a rule and we learn -~b, 
then we cannot deduce ~a despite the fact that if we learned a we would deduce a 
contradiction" (p. 359). a ~ b, -~b ~ -~a is probabilistically valid; a = b ~- -~b = ~a is not 
(el. [141). 
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Proof Call this The Proof: 
1. a A b I-- b 
2. I - - (aAb)=*b  
3. b I-..- b A ((a A b) =* b) 
4. b I.-- a =* b 
5. aA  ~at---b 
6. / - - (aA ~a)=,b  
7. --la I-- -Ta A ((a A --la) =~ b) 
8. ~a  i-.- a =* b 
9. ~a  v bt-.- a ~ b 
by A-elim 
from 1 by weak CP 
from 2 by A-intro 
from 3 by factuality 
by ECQ 
from 5 by weak CP 
from 6 by A-intro 
from 7 by factuality 
from 4 and 8 by weak v -elim 
Nothing I have said so far has required the existence of anything other 
than simple conditionals, conditionals in which the antecedent and conse- 
quent are both =, -free. If we allow conditionals whose consequents may 
themselves be conditionals and if we suppose such conditionals obey 
modus ponens, then the right-to-left direction (traditionally known as 
exportation) of this equivalence, 
b ~ (a =, c) -11- (aAb)  ~c ,  
suffices to yield factuality. In fact we have these connections: 
• Modus ponens for iterated conditionals + exportation (right-to-left 
direction of equivalence) yields factuality. 
• Factuality + importation (left-to-right direction of equivalence) yields 
modus ponens for iterated conditionals. 
Also: 
• Given the principle that if a 1 . . . .  , a~ t-- b then t- (a I A "" A a n) = b, 
we have that factuality ields ordinary (nonvacuous) conditional proof, 
i.e., i ra  1 . . . . .  an+ 1 t-- b then a l , . . . ,a  . t-- a.+ 1 =* b. 
• Ordinary conditional proof + modus ponens yields factuality. 
Exportation, modus ponens, and weak conditional proof immediately 
yield syntactic triviality: 
1. a A b ~- b by A-elim 
2. ~- (a A b) =~ b from 1 by weak CP 
3. ~- b =* (a =, b) from 2 by exportation 
4. b ~- a =~ b from 3 by modus ponens 
5. aA  -~aF-b  byECQ 
6. t-- (a A --1 a) =* b from 5 by weak CP 
7. ~- -1 a =, (a =, b) from 6 by exportation 
8. --1 a t- a =* b from 7 by modus ponens 
9. -7 a V b ~- a =* b from 4 and 8 by weak v-elim 
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Nonetheless it makes sense to regard factuality--or the instances required 
of it in moving between lines 3 and 4 and between lines 7 and 8 in The 
Proof--as the key to collapse to syntactic triviality, primarily because it 
requires no assumptions concerning iterated conditionals, not even that 
they exist. This is not to say that the other steps in The Proof are 
unimportant. As we have seen, factuality is guaranteed if =~ is evaluated 
by residuation on the continuous t-norm used to evaluate A; in such 
circumstances lines 1 through 4 are guaranteed, so failure, if syntactic 
triviality is to be avoided, must lie elsewhere. 
Exportation and importation are probabilistically valid given McGee's 
import-export principle. McGee argues for the principle; Edgington [14] 
says that it seems that our natural-language practice is in accord with both 
exportation and importation. McGee's axioms for conditionals yield (a A 
b) ~ b and (a A -7 a) =* b as theorems. How does he avoid the collapse to 
materiality of the implication? By denying the validity of modus ponens 
applied to compound implications with conditional consequents. Instances 
need not be probabilistically valid, because the identification 
if p(a) >0 then p(a ~c)=p(c /a )  
applies only to elements of S¢ 0. The probability p(a ~ (b =~ c)) need not 
equal p(b ~ e/a), i.e., p(b =,, c /a)  need not equal p(e /a  A b), and 
Lewis's proof is stymied, as is our proof of the probabilistic validity of the 
factuality principle. 6
4. THE GAINES IMPLICATION 
What becomes of The Proof when we read ~ as the Gaines implica- 
tion? The answer depends both on how we evaluate conjunctions semanti- 
cally and on our criterion of semantic validity. If we first consider the rule 
v(a A b) = min{v(a), v(b)} and take an inference to be valid if under no 
evaluation does the conclusion receive a lower value than the least value 
assigned any of the premises, then The Proof is unsound at several steps. 
Although exportation is valid, the Gaines implication is not factual, in part 
because modus ponens is not valid for it. Nevertheless, line 4 of The Proof 
is valid. On the other hand, recalling that v( -7 a) = 1 - v(a), none of lines 
5 through 8 is valid; neither is line 9 if, in addition, v(a v b )= 
max{v(a), v(b)}, max being the conorm dual to min, although the weak 
(quantum-logical) v -elimination is a valid rule of inference under max. 
6Invoking Jeffrey's convenient abuse of notation i  [16], McGee accepts p(a ~ c) = p(c/a) 
but rejects its iteration, p(a ~ c/b) = p((c/a)/b). 
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In [7] Gaines accepted the min-max evaluation rules for A and x/ which 
gives us the analogy between the implication and conditional probabilities. 
However, the Gaines implication can be obtained by residuation on 
multiplication (see e.g., [10, 11, 13, 17, 18]): 
v(a ~ c) = sup{x ~ [0,1] : v(a)-x _< v(c)}. 
Multiplication being continuous, modus ponens is immediately valid pro- 
vided our criterion of validity is that the product of the values assigned the 
premises not exceed the value assigned the conclusion. As we know, 
exportation and importation 
b~ (a~c) - tV -  (a ,b )  ~c  
too are valid for any connective * evaluated by v (a*b)= v(a)-v(b). 
Goguen's context connective is one such [13, 17]. Of more interest for 
present concerns is A, which may be evaluated this way [10, 11, 18], for 
then we have factuality of the implication. However, The Proof still fails. 
Lines 5 through 8 again are not valid, nor is 9 if v(a v b) = v(a) + v(b) - 
v(a). v(b) (x + y -x -y  being the conorm dual to the t-norm x .y).7 
Given any t-norm evaluating A, we can semantically evaluate an impli- 
cation analogously to Adams's principle: v(a ~ e) = v(a A e)/v(a) if v(a) 
> 0; v(a ~ e) = 1 if v(a) = 0. We then have that a*(a ~ e) ~ c, where 
• is Goguen's context (evaluated by multiplication). The resulting implica- 
tion may be somewhat oddly behaved. If the t-norm is Archimedean, 
v(a ~ a) = 1 only if v(a) ~ {0, 1}. The weak rule of conditional proof 
therefore fails (and it is at least arguable that weak CP must be satisfied by 
anything worth calling a conditional). For theoremhood of a =~ a we need 
that T(v(a),v(a))= v(a), for all values taken by v; hence T(x,y)= 
min{x,y} on the range of v, for if v (a)< v(b), then v(a)= T(v(a), 
v(a)) < T(v(a), v(b))< v(a). Hence the Gaines implication is the only 
analogue of the conditional-probability-probability-of-conditional identi- 
fication for which a ~ a is a theorem (when conjunctions are evaluated by 
t-norms). 
Reverting to the min (max) semantics for A (v )  but adopting the 
designated-value approach to validity, if we take [1 - e, 1] as the range of 
1 designated values with 0 < E < ~ and take an inference to be valid if 
under every evaluation which assigns a designated value to each premise 
the conclusion also receives a designated value, The Proof fails. Implica- 
7Residuation on min, i.e., v(a = c) = sup{x ~ [0, 1] : min{v(a), x} < v(c)}, yields the G6del 
evaluation rule, i.e., v(a ~ e) = 1 if v(a) < v(c), and v(c) otherwise (see [10, 11, 19]). Since 
rain is the maximal t-norm, the G6del conditional is the logically strongest conditional 
obtained by residuation on a t-norm ([tl, 19]). 
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tions are factual and modus ponens is a sound rule of inference only if 
--- 0 but the weak rule of conditional proof fails in all cases (i.e., E = 0 
included); in particular, line 5 is valid but line 6 is not. On the other hand, 
line 4 is valid, as is the weak law of v-elimination. Line 8 is valid when 
= 0. When ~ = 0, the implication is syntactically trivial: --1 a v c entails 
a :=~ c. 
Only the designated-value approach to the min-max semantics with 
= 0 collapses the Gaines implication to material implication, but the 
valuations are not entirely classical in effect. This is evident when we 
consider the value of a ~ c according to whether the values of its 
components are designated ("d") or not ("u"). We obtain this table: 
a c a=~c 
d d d 
d u u 
u d d 
u u ? 
- - the  question mark indicating that when neither a nor c takes the 
designated value the implication may or may not take it, depending on 
whether the nondesignated value assigned a is no greater than that 
assigned c. When ¢ > 0 the first "u" in the third column must be replaced 
by "?". Either way (e = 0, ¢ > 0), we get a nonclassical lack of determi- 
nacy. Although preservation of designation is what matters for validity, it is 
the underlying numerical evaluation that ultimately determines whether 
compound formulas are designated; ~ is not "designation-functional" in 
this setting. This suggests that the designated-value(s) approach to the 
semantics of many-valued logics is very much at odds with the spirit of 
fuzzy logic. 
5. FUZZY CONDITIONAL EVENTS 
Thus far I have considered analogues of the procedure that leads to 
triviality in the case of probabi l i tyhthe introduction of a proposition, an 
implication, on a par with others in the language and which therefore has a 
determinate value under every semantic evaluation. Another approach as 
been explored: the introduction of genuinely conditional assertions or 
events. A conditional assertion "e, if a" is true if a and c are both true, 
false if a is true but c false, and neither true nor false when a is false) (For 
aln [6] DiSring identifies rejection of the thesis that "c if a" is determinately true or false in all 
possible worlds as one of three semantic strategies one of which must be adopted if Adams's 
principle is to be upheld. 
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references to the philosophical literature on conditional assertion see [14, 
20].) Analogously, in [21] de Finetti introduced conditional events of which 
he says (p. 68): 
c I a, e conditioned on a, is the logical entity capable of having 
three values: true if a and e are true: false if a is true and c is false: 
void if a is false. 
For de Finetti conditional events are the objects of conditional bets: a bet 
on c conditional on a is won if a and e occur, lost if a occurs but c does not, 
and called off if a fails to occur [21, 20]. In the boolean algebra of subsets 
that standardly constitutes the field of events in mathematical probability 
theory, a conditional event c la  may be defined as the event whose 
indicator function is the restriction of o's indicator function to a and so is 
defined only for elements of a [22]. In [23] Dubois and Prade read c I a as a 
production rule, "a produces e"; when a is false the rule is inapplicable. 
The distinctive feature of condtional events is that with each pair of 
elements of the original language or event space is associated an object of 
a new kind. Exactly what kind depends on how it is introduced. For 
example, on de Finetti's understanding of conditional events there seems 
to be little option but to say that they belong to .~ x~,  the set of all 
ordered pairs of elements of S¢. On the coset or quotient-algebra ap- 
proach, on the other hand, conditional events are subsets of ~(Sa),  the 
power set of 2 [23-25]. In contrast with the introduction of implications 
into a language or event space, these new objects are not expected to obey 
the logicoalgebraic constraints that govern the original domain. Rather, 
the latter is isomorphically embedded into a subdomain of the new objects. 
While my own preference--explained in [20J--is for an approach via 
conditional bets, what is important for present purposes is not which 
objects conditional events are but that they are of a quite different kind 
from those of the classical "base." We should note that de Finetti, Schay, 
and Calabrese all introduce them as bearers of conditional probabilities in 
the sense that, under an extension of the probability distribution p from 
the classical base to these conditional events, these new objects satisfy the 
condition 
p(e I a) =p(c  A a ) /p (a )  when p(a) :~ 0. 
Calabrese seems to have been inspired, at least in part, by Lewis's triviality 
result for implications. 
Given the classical boolean background, we obtain immediately the de 
Finetti-Schay identity condition of [21, 22]: 
c la=d lb  iff aAc=bAd and a=b.  
(Substitute "-~ ~- " for "= " in  the propositional case.) It also makes sense 
to order conditional assertions, conditional events, or production rules by 
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"stringency": c I a ~< d I b, i.e., e I a is more stringent han d I b, iff its 
truth conditions are no wider than d Lb's and its falsity conditions no 
narrower. This yields 
c la~<dlb  iff aAct -bAd andbA-~d~-aA-~c ,  
so that c I a ~ d I b and d lb --< c l a iff the de Finetti-Schay condition 
obtains (see [23]). 
Whether taken as assertion, event, or rule, the binary polarity that 
determines whether the conditional object is susceptible of evaluation 
makes generalization to the fuzzy setting difficult. With designated-value 
semantics we could say: v(c I a) = v(a A c) if v(a) is designated, and is 
otherwise undefined. If the evaluation clause for A is sufficiently well 
behaved, this would yield: c I a takes a designated value if a and e both 
take designated values, takes an undesignated value if a takes a designated 
value but c takes an undesignated value, and takes neither a designated 
nor an undesignated value when a is takes an undesignated value. For a 
properly fuzzy approach one might, instead, adopt the most direct general- 
ization of the classical case, which is to measure the semantic evaluability 
of the conditional c I a by v(a) and its fuzzy truth value by v(a A c). But 
what sense to make of the measures of these two quite distinct properties 
and how to play them off against each other--since they are both always 
defined for all a and c-- is far from clear. 
Perhaps a better--and certainly a clearer--idea is to say that v(c I a) is 
undefined when v(a) = 0 and is otherwise v(a/x c)/v(a), in direct analogy 
with the probabilistic definition. If v(a A c )= min{v(a), v(c)}, we then 
have the original [7] formulation of the Gaines implication [which, main- 
taining the analogy with probability, did not specify a value for the 
implication when v(a) = 0]. This example shows equally clearly that the de 
Finetti-Schay conditions fail: where a, b, and c are atomic propositions, 
~(c  A --lc) l a A --la = -~(c A -~c) I b A -Tb, i.e., their semantic values 
are defined under the same valuations and take the same values then, but 
aA  -Ta~b A ~b. 
Another, less direct route to fuzzy conditional events is possible. In the 
classical setting with bivalent semantic evaluations we can consider this 
"solution set" [23-25]: 
c la  := {b ~Sa:a  A b -~-  a A c}, 
i.e., 
c la  = {b ~.~:  for all v, v(a A b) = v(a A c)}. 
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Any element b in c I a satisfies this truth table from [23]: 
a c b 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 ? 
0 0 ? 
the question mark indicating that either truth-value may be assigned b 
when a is false. In this classical setting c [ a = {b ~.~ : a A c ~- b t- --1 a V 
c}; obv ious lyc la=d lb i f fa  Ac - t t -bAd  and -~avc-~-  - - lbvd ,  
whence follows the de F inett i -Schay identity condition [23]. 
I shall take up the logic of these classical conditional events shortly, but 
first I look at how they may be generalized to the fuzzy setting. Given any 
two t-norms T O and T1, we can define the object 
c [a  := {b ~.~: fo r  all v, To(v(a),v(b)) = Tl(v(a),v(c))}. 
Where T is any strongly tautologous proposit ion and ± is any strongly 
contradictory proposit ion [i.e., v (y )  = 1 and v (±)  = 0 for all evaluations 
v], we have the following: 
a IT  = {b ~.~:b  -~ l -  a} ,  
a l±  = {b E_~:b}  =_~,  
so that a IT  ~ a I±  . I f  b 1 H b t- b2, b 1 ~ C I a, and b 2 ~ c I a, then 
b~c la .  I fT  O = T 1 thenc~c la fora l la ,  c. WhenT 0~T l ,c [amaybe 
empty: for example, when T o is the minimal t-norm T w and Tl(x, y) = xy, 
one has a I a = O unless a -~ ~- T or a H ~ ± (assuming valuations may 
take values other than 0 and 1). Notice that when To(x, y) = xy and T 1 is 
min, then, unless a -~ t- ± ,  one has c I a = {b ~.~:b  -t t- a ~ c}, where 
is the Gaines implication. 
From now on I shall consider only the case when T o = T1, so that 
c la={b~.W: for  all v, v (aAb)=c(aAc)}  and A is evaluated by a 
t-norm. Clearly, if b~c la  then aAct -b~-a : : *c ,  where =* is the 
implication evaluated by residuation on the t-norm evaluating A. These 
upper and lower bounds on membership of  c l a need not be attained. 
With the minimal t-norm Tw, a ~ -~ a ~ -~ a I a when a is contingent, i.e., 
neither a -~ ~-T nor a H t -2 .  With the product t-norm and atomic 
propositions a, b, and c, we have c [ a = c [ b = {d E .~:c  -t t- d} and 
both clauses of  the de F inett i -Schay identity condition fail. The upper 
bound may not be attained if T is not continuous. 
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LEMMA 1 Neither the upper nor the lower bound is attained under any 
Archimedean t-norm unless all valuations are bivalent. 
Proof  If  the upper bound is attained, then a ~ a ~ a I a for all a. But 
then v(a) = T(v(a),  1) = T(v(a),  v(a =~ a)) = v(a A a) = T(v(a),  v(a)), 
for every valuation v. So, for any x in [0, 1] attained by some valuation v, 
x = T(x, x) and T is non-Arch imedean unless x ~ {0, 1}. 
If a A c ~ c I a, then for every valuation v, T(v(a),  v(a A c)) = v(a /x e), 
so, for those values x and y in [0,1] attained by a valuation v, 
T(x, T(x, y)) = T(x, y). In particular, x = T(x, x), since 1 is attained (by 
b ~ b) and T is non-Archimedean unless x ~ {0, 1}. • 
LEMMA 2 I f  lower bounds are attained under a continuous t-norm, so are 
upper bounds. 
Proof  As T is continuous, T(v(a),  v(a =~ b)) < v(b). But then v(a A b) 
= T(v(a),  v(b)) < T(v(a),  v(a =* b)). As the lower bound is attained, v(a 
A e) = T(v(a),  v(a A c)) = T(v(a),  T(v(a),  v(c))). As 1 is attained (by c =, 
c), T(v(a),  v(a)) = v(a) for all a. But then T(v(a),  v(a ~ b)) = T(T(v(a), 
v(a)), v(a ~ b)) = T(v(a),  T(v(a),  v(a =~ b))) < T(v(a),  v(b)) = v(a A b). 
THEOREM 4 I f  upper bounds are attained under a t-norm or lower bounds 
attained under a continuous t-norm, then the de Finetti-Schay identity 
condition is met only if every valuation is bivalent. 
Proof  On those values attained under a valuation v, we have T = min. 
As =~ is evaluated by residuation, v(a ~ c) = 1 when v(a) < v(e). Other-  
wise, since by assumption or by Lemma 2 T(v(a),  v(a =* e)) = v (a /x  c), we 
have min{v(a), v(a =~ e)} = min{v(a), v(c)} = v(c), i.e., v(a =~ e) = v(c). So 
=~ is the G6del  implication. Where a, b, and c are atomic proposit ions it 
is readily seen that -1 (e =~ e) I --1 (a /x  -~ a) = -1 (c =, e) l -7 (b A --1 b) but 
(a /x  ~ a) ~ -1 (b /x  ~ b) if valuations take values other than 0 and 1. • 
While not an exhaustive analysis, these results suggest that only in the 
classical boolean case does the de F inett i -Schay identity condition for 
conditional events obtain. I end by examining this case further. 
6. CLASSICAL CONDIT IONAL EVENTS 
Logicoalgebraic operat ions can be introduced on conditional events 
(however defined). Of  the various possibilities canvassed by Schay [22], 
Calabrese [24], and Goodman and Nguyen [25], Dubois and Prade [23] 
Fuzzy Implications and Conditional Events 139 
follow Calabrese in preferr ing these: 
(c la )  ®(d lb )  = [ (~av  
(c la)  e (d lb )  =[ (aAc)  
~ (c la )  = -Tc la  
c) A ( -~b V d)] I (a v b) (conjunct ion),  9 
v (b A d)] I (a v b) (dis junction),  
(negat ion) .  
Schay [22] says that ®, ¢ ,  and ~ seem to "correspond to the usual 
meaning of the words "and",  "or"  and "not  .... (p. 335). 1° Conjunct ion and 
disjunction are so chosen that De Morgan's  laws obtain. Notice that if 
b ~- c then (a IT )  ® (c I b) = a IT .  
We should perhaps note that the structure (_oWl_~, ®,  • ,  ~ ), where 
-2°1.2° = {c I a :a  ~.Zf, c ~2},  is not a lattice: (e l a) • ((c I a) ® (d I b)) is 
of the form [ . . .  ] I a v b and cannot be identical with c I a when b ~- a. 
Condit ional  events are ordered by stringency, which is equivalent to [23]: 
c la~d lb  iff aAcF -bAd and ~aVcF-  -~bvd.  
If b~-c  then _ t_ lT~aVb l - l -~b la~c la~ ~aVc lT~TIT .  
The mapping h , (b )= b la  is readi ly seen to induce a homomorph ism 
from the L indenbaum algebra of  .20 into the algebra of  condit ional  events 
with h . (b  A c) = (b la )  ® (c I a), h , (b  V c) = (b I a) ¢ (c I a), and 
h , (~b)  = ~ (b I a). When a = q-,  h. (b)  = h,(e) iff b -~ ~- c, i.e., the in- 
duced map from the L indenbaum algebra is injective. Each e lement  a of 
the original domain  can be identif ied with a I T [22, 23]. 
We have this analogue of modus ponens [23]: 
(a l i )  ® (b la)  = (a Ab) lY~b lT  
and this of the mult ipl icat ion rule for condit ional  probabi l i ty [23]: 
(b la )®(c laAb)  =(bAc)  la~c la .  
9Applying this definition to de Finetti's conditional events, aconditional bet on (e I a) ® (d I b) 
is lost if one or both of e I a and d I b is false, is called off it both a and b are false, and is 
otherwise won. McGee's rules for betting on conjunctive compounds of conditionals have the 
bet proceed in the same circumstances, but it pays out somewhat differently [5]: a bet on 
(a~e)  A(b~d)  is lost if (aA ~c) V(-~bVd), is won if aAbAcAd,  yields an 
"intermediate" payout if (-~a A b A d) v (-~b A a A c), and is otherwise called off. The 
intermediate payout is determined by the betting rates on whichever of a ~ c and b ~ d has 
a false antecedent. On McGee's scheme a bet on (a ~ c)A (b ~ d) is not properly a 
conditional bet as defined above. See [26] for counterintuitive consequences of McGee's 
payoff conditions. 
l°Dubois and Prade [27] and Calabrese [28] defend their choice of definitions; for criticisms 
see Goodman [29]. 
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Dubois and Prade follow Calabrese's uggestion for incorporating iterated 
conditional events [23, 24], an analogue of exportation and importation: 
(c lb )  l a = el  (a A b). 
Does (the analogue) of modus ponens obtain for iterated conditional 
events? Notice that we have no immediate argument for it, since ((a A 
(c lb ) ) lT ,  which is what we get if we apply the identity above to 
(a I T )  ® ((c I b) [ a), is not well formed. Our  analogue for iterated condi- 
tional events must then be 
(a IT)  ® ((c I b) I a) + (c I b) IT = c I b. 
An analogue of The Proof  now shows that on pain not of triviality but of 
outright contradiction this cannot hold generally. We have: 
b IT  = (b iT )  ® (b I b A a) = (b IT )  ® ((b I a) I b) ~ b]  a 
and 
-~a lT=( -~a IT )  ® (bl ~a  Aa)  =(~aIT )  ®( (b la )  l ~a)  ~b la .  
But 
if b la~<eld  and c la~e ld  then bVc la~e ld  
(see [23]). Therefore,  -~ a V b I T ~ b I a ~< -~ a v b I T , whence total col- 
lapse: T[_L = T IT ,  i.e., {a ~.~:a  ~ ~- T} =.~.  So we do not have 
modus ponens for iterated conditionals. 
Equally the collapse shows that we cannot have the analogue of syntac- 
tic triviality: -~ a v c IT  ~< c I a. The reason why it is avoided is of some 
interest. For all a and c, c I a ~< T I T ,  so the latter is a maximal element 
under the stringency ordering. But (c I a) ® (T  I T )  = ~ a W c IT  ~ c I a, 
so ® is not a proper  conjunction under the ordering ~.  (For any 
conjunction A defined either lattice-theoretically or by a t-norm with 
domain [0, 1] we have x A 1 = x, where 1 is the maximal e lement in the 
lattice or the domain of the t-norm.) 
Given a probabil ity distribution p on the sentences of _~, we can induce 
one on conditional events by assigning to c I a the conditional probabil ity 
p (c /a )  if p (a )> 0 and 1 otherwise. Schay [22] notes that given the 
definition of ® we may have p((c I a) ® (d I b)) > 0 but p(c I a) = 0. We 
have a similarly striking example of nonclassical behavior with (e l a) ® 
(T IT ) ,  for p (~a W c) > p(c la )  unless p(a)  = 1 or p (c la )  = 1.11 
liThe literature on approximate r asoning attributes this observation to Calabrese (e.g., [23, 
25]). A discrepancy between p(e/a) and p( -1 a v c) was noted by Schay [22]. Dorn [31] traces 
it to Karl Popper's work on probability in the 1930s. 
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although p(T I 7-) = 1, we mostly have p((c I a) ® ( 7- I T)) > p(c [ a). We 
can only have p(-~a v c )=p(c la )  systematically if p is two-valued 
(dispersion-free). 
Notice that if the de Finetti-Schay identity condition is to be probabilis- 
tically valid we must take seriously the lack of definition of p(c/a)  when 
p(a) = 0. Otherwise we have that p(a [ a) = p(b I b), i.e., p (a /a)  = p(b/b), 
for all probability distributions p, but a I a = b I b iff a and b are logically 
equivalent. Restoring the "gap" suffices to restore probabilistic validity to 
the de Finetti-Schay identity condition. 
However badly behaved the conjunction ®, we end this section with a 
positive result: probabilities defined on the algebra (~1~,  ®, @, ~ ) 
satisfy what is known, in the context of probability distributions ( tates) on 
orthomodular lattices, as the Jauch-Piron condition [32]: 
i fp (c la )  =p(d lh )  = 1 then p( (c la )@ (d I b)) = 1. 
Proof If p (c la )=p(d lb )= 1 then p( -TaVc)=p( -~bvd)= 1. 
Consequently, p ( (~a Vc) A ( -TbVd) )= 1 and p( (~aVc)  A(-~b v 
d) la vb)=p( (c la )®(d lb ) )= 1. • 
7. CONCLUSION 
Conditional objects can take two forms. On the one hand there are what 
I have called implications--entities whose status is no different from that 
of other propositions (events) and that are thus evaluated under every 
semantic valuation. On the other there are genuinely conditional objects, 
conditional events or conditional assertions, for which the issue of seman- 
tic evaluation does not arise unless some (semantic) condition on the 
antecedent is satisfied. Only the latter's probabilities can be equated with 
conditional probabilities defined on sentences of .2 ~. 
The picture is quite the opposite in fuzzy logic. There is no difficulty 
introducing implications whose semantic value under every valuation is 
determined by an analogue of the definition of conditional probability. On 
the other hand, it seems that it is only in the case of bivalent evaluations 
that enough space opens up for conditional events to give us anything 
distinctively new while satisfying the de Finetti-Schay identity condition. 
A line for future inquiry opens up: weakening the identity condition. 
The investigation above suggests this possibility: 
c la=d lb  iff aAc=bAd and a~c=b~d,  
where ~ is the implication evaluated by residuation on the t-norm 
evaluating A, although we have some grounds for thinking only the t-norm 
rain will return sensible results under this condition. 
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